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In an effort to address financial constraints and environmental concerns states 
have increasingly turned to a combination of un-tolled (HOV) and tolled (HOT) 
lanes. Public-private partnerships (3Ps) are a popular mechanism for this more 
sustainable approach to highway infrastructure that couples environmental 
sustainability (efficient utilization of existing lanes, less congestion) with financial 
sustainability (private investment). This chapter offers an approach to 3P contract 
writing for HOV/HOT facilities that is structured by a stakeholder analysis of actors 
in the project accountability environment. By analyzing two Virginia 3P highway 
projects, the chapter shows it is possible to build into a contract a set of terms and 
conditions to enhance the likelihood of meeting the goals of multiple stakeholders. 
By necessity, such contracts cannot specify precise monetary returns and other 
stakeholder benefits, but they can be written to include trade-offs to minimize losses 
to one party at the expense of another. 
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INTRODUCTION
Financial constraints and environmental concerns are promoting the development 
of tolled highway projects that encourage less driving with a combination of (un-
tolled) high occupancy vehicle (HOV) lanes and high occupancy toll (HOT) lanes. 
HOV/HOT projects are financially sustainable when the private sector is a partner 
who invests money in the project. The projects are environmentally sustainable 
when they add fewer lane miles of pavement than a traditional roadway expansion, 
consume less land, and offer drivers a choice between un-tolled lanes and a tolled 
lane that is faster and less congested. 
Public-private partnerships (3Ps) are a popular mechanism for this more 
sustainable approach to new highway infrastructure. However, many 3Ps are risk-
prone due to their complexity and the unpredictable nature of the revenue streams 
they frequently create (Urban Land Institute, 2013). The risks and uncertainties 
challenge accountability. This is especially the case when public infrastructure 
investments assume adequate returns to the parties over an extended time horizon 
(Hodge, 2004). Given the ambiguity of future events, it is impossible to specify all 
the desired results in the contract. Thus, it is difficult for the parties to hold each 
accountable for any failure to deliver. In this regard, 3Ps to build tolled facilities 
can subvert the conventional approach to accountability and fail to generate the 
expected financial and environmental benefits.
Public and private sector actors thus may face the prospect of a failed project. 
Farmer (2018) provides a classic example of a local government suffering a substantial 
loss from a poorly designed contract with the private sector. The City of St. Louis 
lost money when its NFL team, the Rams, moved to Los Angeles. The Rams owners 
used a loophole in their contract with the St. Louis Regional Convention and Sports 
Complex Authority to avoid paying the rest of the Rams’ share of the $259 million, 
30-year bond used to finance the construction of a football stadium (Farmer, 2018). 
The Rams were able to leave the taxpayers on the hook for the remaining financial 
obligation because in its leasing agreement with the team, St. Louis officials agreed 
that the new stadium would remain rated in the top 25 percent of all NFL stadiums. 
When the financially-strapped city refused to make the stadium upgrades to keep it 
in the top 25 percent, the team’s lease was not renewed. St. Louis officials made a 
simple error—they did not stipulate in the contract that the team must continue to 
lease the stadium so long as any of the debt remained outstanding.
This chapter offers an approach to 3P contract writing for HOV/HOT facilities 
that is structured by a stakeholder analysis of the interests of all the actors in the 
accountability environment surrounding a project’s field. Rather than specifying 
precise outcomes of the highway projects, the contracts analyzed were strategically 
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designed to reduce risk by setting up a range of potential outcomes to increase the 
likelihood that all stakeholders in the project’s field benefit. This can be viewed 
as a type of emergent accountability in that the contract contains mechanisms 
that adjust outcomes to minimize the prospect of extreme gains and losses by the 
interested parties. 
The objective of this chapter is to show that it is possible to build into a 3P 
contract a set of terms and conditions to enhance the likelihood of meeting the 
goals of multiple stakeholders. By necessity, such contracts cannot specify precise 
monetary returns and other stakeholder benefits. They can, however, be written to 
include trade-offs to minimize losses to one party at the expense of another. This 
can be done, in part, by taking into account conditions that could lead to a one-sided 
distribution of outcomes.
The chapter begins by discussing advantages of a stakeholder approach to 
devising contracts for multi-sectoral public-private partnerships. This is followed by 
a description of the frequent elements of two common accountability environments. 
The authors then describe two Virginia highway projects, highlighting the risks 
involved. The contracts are then analyzed with a focus on the techniques deployed 
to foster accountability to all stakeholders when the ultimate distribution of gains 
and losses from tolling is unpredictable.
BACKGROUND
State Transportation Agencies, Privatization, 
and Public-Private Partnerships
As Yusuf and O’Connell (2014) note, local and state governments are increasingly 
forming partnerships with the private sector to provide transportation infrastructure in 
an effort to address expanding needs under the constraint of limited public resources. 
In the transportation arena, growing privatization has many roots, including shortages 
of government personnel and the resulting lack of expertise in the public sector, 
expansion of demand for transportation services and infrastructure, and pressures to 
reduce costs and improve quality (Gen & Kingsley, 2007; Ponomariov & Kingsley, 
2008; Warne, 2003; Yusuf & O’Connell, 2014). 
As of 2016, 34 states, the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico had enabling 
legislation allowing them to enter into 3Ps (Slone, 2016). From the late 1980s 
through 2013, the number of transportation-related 3Ps has steadily grown (Z. Chen, 
Daito, & Gifford, 2014). The popularity of 3Ps can be attributed to many factors, 
including innovation and new technology emanating from the private sector, the 
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need for private sector expertise, and especially the potential for private funding for 
transportation infrastructure and services.
While the opportunity for successful public-private partnerships is great, it is 
certainly not without risk (Urban Land Institute, 2013). Public officials are accountable 
to many stakeholders and 3Ps can exacerbate accountability challenges (Yusuf & 
Leavitt, 2014). Moreover, the accountability challenge is multidimensional, especially 
when the contract extends over many years (Hodge 2004; Grimsey and Lewis 2001). 
Roumboutsos and Pantelias (2015) note that 3Ps “are not actual ‘partnerships’, but 
strict legal transactions where all parties are contractually bound into delivering 
their own part in the project under detailed specifications and requirements” (p. 
186). As such, contracts for long-term 3Ps must address a variety of potential risks, 
among them engineering and design failures, poor construction, expensive delays, 
maintenance failures, revenue shortfalls, funding risks, environmental issues, changes 
in government policies, and possible project default (Grimsey and Lewis 2001). 
As contracts lengthen unforeseen challenges to project success can mount (Hodge 
2004). This places a premium on the creation of contract terms that build in flexibility 
over the course of the contract and a willingness to negotiate changes in partner 
expectations for results. We view the willingness to negotiate these changes as an 
emergent form of accountability in which outcomes for partners can evolve with 
changing circumstances. In this regard, contracts assume good faith collaboration 
among partners who cooperate with each other to create mutually acceptable solutions 
to the problems that arise (Willems, Verhoest, Voets, Copperns, Van Dooren, and Van 
den Hurk 2016). Contracts can be structured in ways to encourage creative responses 
to potential contingencies. A degree of flexibility can be built into contracts, for 
instance, some contracts call for a resort to third parties to provide dispute resolution 
to enable adjustments in fees and revenue allocation. (Shrestha, Chan, Aibinu and 
Chen 2017). Awareness of the need to respond to changing conditions has led to 
the elimination from many contracts of the non-competition clauses that prevented 
governments from building new facilities in the same geographic area in subsequent 
years (Siemiatycki 2009).
For successful 3Ps, Little (2011) contends, the various project risks should be 
“transparently identified, equitably allocated, and costed appropriately” (p. 246). 
Political risks, which could include cancellation of the concession or the introduction 
of regulatory policies, should be borne by the state. The private partner should be 
expected to control construction risks (e.g., incorrect or inappropriate design, project 
delays, etc.) and operation and maintenance risks (e.g., physical condition of the 
facility, poor construction quality, etc.). If income risk or any risks that would reduce 
use or profitability is to be held by the private contractor, careful consideration of 
usage and revenue projections should be addressed in the contract (Little, 2011).
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We focus on the terms in the contracts that facilitate negotiation and mutual 
adjustment. We show that the parties had to build terms into the HOV/HOT contracts 
that facilitated working together to reach the twin goals of maintaining a smooth 
traffic flow while providing a profitable revenue stream. The greatest risk for the 
state was a possible failure to maintain the desired level of traffic flow; for the private 
sector firm a failure to maintain a profitable income stream.
Congestion and HOV/HOT Projects
With rising vehicle ownership in the U.S., traffic congestion has become a major 
threat to the quality of urban life. According to the American Society of Civil 
Engineers (2017), more than 40% of the country’s major urban highways are 
congested, costing, in 2014, an estimated $160 billion in wasted time and fuel, 
6.9 billion hours in traffic delays (42 hours per driver) and 3.1 billion gallons of 
gasoline. From 2013 to 2014, 95% of the 100 largest metropolitan areas in the U.S., 
had increased traffic congestion. 
More lane miles are needed to reduce congestion but budgetary shortfalls persist. 
In response, states and localities have begun implementing creative strategies 
aimed at reducing congestion while simultaneously raising roadway funds. Policy 
makers are increasingly turning over the responsibilities for roadway management 
and upkeep to private companies even though this has produced mixed results 
(Boarnet & Dimento, 2004). Another common approach has been to increase the 
use of variable rate tolling on specifically designated HOV/HOT lanes (Copeland 
& Overberg, 2012). HOV/HOT lanes give drivers a choice. Drivers can car pool or 
pay a toll to use the less congested toll lane or they can avoid the toll by driving in 
the un-tolled lane(s).
HOV lanes are designed to encourage carpooling and, in turn, ease congestion 
and roadway stress, but the effectiveness of HOV lanes at addressing congestion 
has been limited. Research finds that HOV lanes are typically underused with little 
ameliorative impact on either congestion or the environment (Poole Jr & Orski, 
2000; Safirova, Gillingham, Harrington, & Nelson, 2003). 
As the questionable impact of HOV lanes has become increasingly clear, many 
states have started converting existing HOV lanes to HOT lanes (Poole Jr & Orski, 
2000). HOT lanes can charge a set fee or charge variable fees based on congestion 
at a given time throughout the day. Variable fees maintain the smooth flow of traffic 
in the toll lanes by raising fees when traffic volumes increase and, conversely, 
lowering fees when traffic volumes decrease.(Copeland & Overberg, 2012). The 
basic premise of variable rate fees is that some people are willing to pay higher rates 
to avoid peak-time congestion. 
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In addition to controlling and limiting congestion, HOT lanes also generate 
higher toll revenues and often eliminate the need for new or additional roadway 
construction (Transcore, 2009). Perhaps, more importantly to drivers, HOT lanes 
typically offer the added peace of mind of predictable travel times (Harlow, 2013).
While many HOV lane structures have begun full conversions to HOT lanes, a 
significant number of federal roadways have begun incorporating both the HOT and 
HOV lanes together in unison (Perez, Batac, & Vovsha, 2012). One of the reasons for 
the combination is the federal government’s regulations regarding tolling on federal 
roadways. By combining HOT lanes with existing HOV lanes, the government is 
able to retain the integrity of the HOV system, while generating additional revenue 
through additional HOT lane use by toll paying single occupant drivers (Perez et 
al., 2012). The benefits to this approach are many. In addition to the much needed 
revenue generated by HOT lane users, the typically underutilized HOV lanes receive 
increased traffic and usage, which in turn decreases overall congestion for all roadway 
users (Safirova et al., 2003).
The Stakeholder Approach to Public-Private 
Partnerships and Accountability
The perspectives of different stakeholders are important in considering 3Ps, since 
3Ps are generally long-term partnership between two stakeholder groups - the public 
agency and the private firm – with implications for a third category of stakeholders 
– users and the general public (Forrer, Kee, Newcomer, & Boyer, 2010; Grossi & 
Thomasson, 2015; Liyanage & Villalba-Romero, 2015).
For transportation agencies, accountability to the public is a critical aspect of 
3Ps (Forrer et al., 2010; Wu, Liu, Jin, & Sing, 2016). The delegation of authority 
to nongovernmental entities (i.e., private firms) can lead to the potential loss of 
legitimacy, since the former government function is now accomplished indirectly 
and at arms’ length. However, while government agencies can transfer power to the 
private sector, they cannot transfer legitimacy and accountability in the same way. 
3Ps change the venue within which transportation infrastructure and services are 
delivered; but they do not eliminate the transportation agency’s responsibility to the 
public. 3Ps can only work well if the government agency manages the partnership 
effectively and ensures continued private partner accountability (Hodge & Greve, 
2017; Milward & Provan, 2003; Milward & Provan, 2000; Skelcher, 2010).
Kearns (1996) coined the term ‘accountability environment’ to capture the 
complex nature of the public’s search for accountable governance. Accountability 
frequently emerges from the interplay of the multiple actors who can be said to 
comprise the organizational environment or ‘field.’ Besides the focal organization, 
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the field includes the external organizations and interested parties with a stake in 
the focal organization’s activities. In the transportation arena, state transportation 
agencies (i.e., state Departments of Transportation, DOTs) must manage complex 
stakeholder relations (O’Connell, Yusuf, & Hackbart, 2009; Yusuf, O’Connell, 
Hackbart, & Wallace, 2008) that have increasingly been marked by contracting and 
partnerships (Lockwood, 1998; Warne, 2003) 
Accountability is a multidimensional product of the stakeholders operating in the 
accountability environment (Hill & Hupe, 2002; Hult & Walcott, 1990; O’Connell, 
2005, 2006), and, therefore, as O’Connell et al. suggest, accountability in multiparty 
situations results “from negotiations between the parties that share powers” (2009, 
p. 410). When forging a contract for a 3P transportation project the stakeholders 
include, among others, the state DOT, the road builder, environmentalists, drivers, 
local residents, taxpayers, and elected officials. 
A public-private partnership is a collaboration involving actors and/or funding 
from the public sector on the one hand and the private sector on the other. It is a 
contractual agreement between the public sector and a private partner “wherein 
the private sector, in exchange for compensation, agrees to deliver facilities and/
or services that have been or could be provided by the public sector” (Little, 2011, 
p. 243). The private sector contributes resources and expertise, and has a fiscal 
incentive to maintain efficient management of the roadway (Krol, 2016; van Den 
Hurk & Verhoest, 2017). As a jointly developed endeavor, costs, risks, rewards, 
and resources can be shared in a variety of ways as stipulated in the contract that 
underpins the partnership. Table 1 compares the typical accountability environment 
under which public-private partnerships are constructed to that under which simple 
contracts are constructed. Accountability under a 3P is not necessarily the product 
of a hierarchical relationship in which the government agency can define the project 
results in advance and sanction the contractor (private partner) for any failure to reach 
the desired outcomes. When multiple actors with manifold ties to each other and 
different goals are in play, the degree and extent of accountability is best described 
as emerging from their multi-stranded interactions. 
Simple contracting out works best when there is little inherent project or task 
uncertainty. The contract specifies the outcomes and obligations of each party. If 
a contractor fails to provide the agreed upon service in the stipulated manner, the 
government can sanction the contractor, who is accountable to the government 
agency and assumes all risk. The relationship between contractor and government is 
an exchange of fee for service, frequently formed after the submission of competitive 
bids with only a minimal amount of negotiation of the terms of the contract. Just 
as there is little or no sharing of risk, there is little or no sharing of property rights. 
Table 1 lists an example of a simple contract—a state government paying a firm to 
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lay a 2-inch overlay of asphalt on a highway. Employees of the state DOT routinely 
inspect the work to ensure compliance with the terms of the contract. If the contractor 
fails to make a profit or performs poorly, the contractor suffers the consequences. 
The contractor can rarely re-negotiate the terms or ask for more payment.
Public-private partnerships, in contrast, tend to involve work that is less certain, 
producing effects that are unpredictable and sometimes undesirable, such as shortfalls 
in projected revenue streams. The loss of revenue can ultimately doom a project, as 
was the case in the recent bankruptcy of the State Highway 130 project in Texas. 
The project, noteworthy for its 85 mph speed limit, lasted just four years into a fifty-
year pact before the concessionaire filed for bankruptcy citing traffic revenues and 
usage drastically less than initial projections (Wilson, 2017). 
Such outcomes can produce losses for multiple stakeholders. When the government 
agency and the contractor enter a relationship, mutual trust, negotiation and discussion 
are necessary. In many cases, the relationship exists prior to the signing of the 
contract, as the objectives of the project and means used to attain them are jointly 
discussed. Often, there is sharing of property rights and income streams between 
the parties. Risk too is shared and the government, as in the case of the city of St. 
Louis and the runaway football Rams, can suffer financial losses.
3Ps often involve interdependent stakeholders from multiple sectors with diverse 
interests and goals (Gray, 1989; Liyanage & Villalba-Romero, 2015). Some goals 
are shared (Frey, Lohmeier, Lee, & Tollefson, 2006), but others diverge, which can 
increase the risks. Decision making tends to be shared between the parties and the 
Table 1. A comparison of the accountability environment for simple contracting out 
and tolling public-private partnership
Accountability Environment for 
Contract Development Simple Contracting Out Tolling Public-Private Partnership
Degree of project certainty Higher Lower
Specificity of contractor 
outcomes and obligations Higher
Combination of specified and 
unspecified
Relationship formation Competitive bidding with minimal discussion
Discussion and negotiation prior to and 
post contract finalization
Ownership of property and/or 
income rights Government Shared property and/or income rights
Burden of risk for project failure Contractor assumes majority of risks
Risk is shared with a range of acceptable 
outcomes for multiple parties
Type of accountability Hierarchical Emergent
Typical project Contract for 2-inch overlay on state highway
Contract for toll road with partner rights 
to toll for specified number of years
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distribution of outcomes is a product of negotiation. Therefore, accountability in 
public-private partnerships tends to emerge over the duration of the contract as the 
parties respond to unforeseen circumstances. Consequently, it is necessary to build 
into the contract carefully crafted but flexible incentive structures—specifications 
that provide ample room for negotiation (Dewatripont & Legros, 2005; Engel, 
Fischer, & Galetovic, 2013). 
Accountability tends to emerge through the give and take of negotiation or through 
the construction of more elaborate terms in the contract, which can enumerate different 
outcomes based on contingencies that may arise over time. Some toll road contracts, 
for instance, may reduce contractor risk by allowing the contractor to raise tolls in 
the future but with a limit on the absolute size of the toll or the contractor’s profit. 
Even with such provisions, forecasting accurate and realistic traffic projections 
remain critical to project success. Few cases illustrate the importance better than 
the failed 75-year agreement between the State of Indiana and the Indiana Toll 
Road Concession Company. With a nearly $4 billion upfront cost, it was estimated 
that the concessionaire would need roughly 11 million toll paying vehicles to travel 
the turnpike between Chicago and Ohio. Once complete, nearly half as many did 
so. The resulting bankruptcy and debt reconsolidation have only compounded the 
problems for all involved (Puentes, 2014).
This chapter’s analysis of accountability builds on Gray’s (1989) observation 
that collaboration between parties to a contract is needed when the stakeholders 
are interdependent and decision-making involves joint ownership, collective 
responsibility for future outcomes, and the ability to view accountability as emerging 
from negotiation in a constructive work environment. The analysis documents that the 
Virginia DOT devised 3P contracts that built in disclosure, feedback, and processes 
for collective voice that ensure each stakeholder is able to play a meaningful role 
in the lengthy life-cycle of the contract. Of course, the involvement of specific 
stakeholders can vary over time (El-Gohary, Osman, & El-Diraby, 2006). 
One key to 3P success is the presence of a shared goal, which in this case of 
the two 3P projects analyzed in this chapter was the construction of toll lanes that 
Virginia drivers would pay to use in future years. Another key to successful 3Ps is 
contractual flexibility to ensure that incentives and risks remain balanced over the 
life of the contract. The explicit sharing of risk is a key aspect of 3P projects (Hodge 
& Greve, 2017), and flexibility in the contract helps to curb financial risk for both 
public and private stakeholders, while maximizing public benefit (Schank, 2011). 
The flexibility to undo a poorly written contract, “should such undoing become 
necessary,” is vitally important for all involved (Boarnet & Dimento, 2004, p. 30). 
Prior to construction the parties established a number of agreed upon metrics 
which were designed to limit loss to the stakeholders under defined circumstances 
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(Dewatripont & Legros, 2005). This creates an ongoing evaluation process that 
reassures partners that they can negotiate corrections to handle emergent contingencies 
(Ahadzi & Bowles, 2004). Indeed, the two 3P contracts analyzed were very detailed, 
containing numerous deadlines, oversight mechanisms, construction and maintenance 
standards, reporting requirements, and sanctions for failure to perform along with 
dispute resolution procedures including conditions for contract termination or re-
structuring.
TWO PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP CASE STUDIES
The core of this chapter is two 3P case studies of HOV/HOT projects in Northern 
Virginia, outside of Washington, D.C. A summary of the two projects is provided 
in Table 2. 
The Virginia DOT entered into two long-term contracts for the construction of 
toll lanes: one with Capital Beltway Express LLC for the I-495 HOT lanes project 
and the other with I-95 Express Lanes LLC for the I-95 HOV/HOT lanes project. 
The toll roads were managed over the term of the contracts by Fluor-Transurban 
Corporation, which paid for the bulk of the construction and was allowed to set and 
collect tolls over the long life of the contract—80 years for I-495 and 76 years for 
I-95. The private sector partner, referred to in the contracts as the concessionaire, 
agreed to design, build, finance, operate, and maintain the facility (a DBFOM 
contract) and do so according to the conditions laid out in the contracts. The public 
partner, VDOT, for its part, paid 20% of the construction cost for the I-495 project 
and 11% for the I-95 project. VDOT was not financially responsible for operation 
and maintenance after construction.
Table 2. Summary of the 3P case studies
I-495 HOV/HOT Project I-95 HOV/HOT Project
Fiscal year approved 2008 2012
Projected/total cost $2.07 billion $948 million
Percent of public investment 20% 11%
Miles covered 14 29.4
Contract duration 80 years 76 years
Competing proposals 0 1
Source(s): Amended And Restated Comprehensive Agreement Relating To The Route 495 Hot Lanes in 
Virginia Project, 2007; Comprehensive Agreement Relating To The I-95 HOV/HOT Lanes Project, 2012. 
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The contracts obligate the concessionaire to operate and maintain the facilities 
over the life of the contracts according to a set of standards. In each contract, 
there is an agreed upon performance point system that applies five years after the 
service commencement date. The Virginia DOT monitors performance and “If 
the Department determines any breach or failure…has occurred, the Department 
shall…deliver to the Concessionaire written notice thereof describing the breach or 
failure in reasonable detail” (section 8.16(iii)). The concessionaire must ‘cure’ the 
breach or failure within a specified period of time to remove points and/or avoid 
incurring new ones. The contract stipulates that the concessionaire can object to 
the determination of a breach and the awarding of points.
The non-compliance performance point system is used as an accountability tool, 
albeit, one that may provide a range of divergent outcomes. In either agreement, if 
the number of performance points continues to accumulate and/or breaches are not 
being cured in a timely manner, several actions may then be taken, starting with 
increased departmental monitoring and proceeding to the mandatory development of 
a remedial plan. Failure to meet the goals of the remedial plan can result in contract 
termination. But the non-compliance performance point system affords flexibility to 
each sector and recognizes the inevitability of breaches. Increased monitoring only 
occurs after the assessment of 135 performance points during any 365 day cycle 
and a remedial plan is only demanded after the assessment of 200 or more points 
during any 365 day cycle.
To discourage improper resort to contract termination, damages can be sought 
by both the concessionaire and the department depending on the circumstances. 
The power to seek damages prevents either party from using the non-compliance 
performance point system to void the contract without valid reason.
The I-495 Project
The contract for the I-495 project -- Amended and restated comprehensive agreement 
relating to the route I-495 HOT lanes in Virginia project (2007) -- was agreed to on 
December 19, 2007 between the Virginia Department of Transportation and Capital 
Beltway Express LLC, an entity formed by Fluor and Transurban to design, finance, 
construct, and ultimately operate new high-occupancy tolling lanes, designed to 
moderate and ease congestion around the nation’s capital. 
The project called for the construction of two HOT express lanes in each direction 
along 14 miles of Virginia I-495. High Occupancy Vehicles would not pay a toll 
when using the HOT lanes. Single occupant vehicles in the toll lanes would pay a 
toll that varied by time of day and level of congestion. Thus, toll paying vehicles with 
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only a driver and high occupancy vehicles with a driver and passenger(s) could use 
the same lanes. This can reduce overall highway congestion as well as congestion 
for those who use the un-tolled lanes (Safirova et al., 2003). 
Sustainability Goals
This chapter’s focus is on the aspects of the contract that introduce an element 
of uncertainty and potential failure that the contract attempts to minimize. The 
foremost goal of the I-495 3P project was to provide drivers with a choice of toll 
lanes that would provide a free flow operating standard for travel on I-495. The 
un-tolled lanes did not have an operating standard and could be congested with 
bumper-to-bumper traffic. Free flow would be accomplished with electronic tolling 
(with video equipment, transponders, or other technology) and an absence of toll 
booths and plazas. 
Achieving the project’s goal would also require variable toll fees to closely 
regulate driver use of the toll lane so as to meet the free flow standard. When the 
highway is congested and free flow is constrained, the toll rate would rise to a 
level high enough to divert drivers to the un-tolled lanes. The means to accomplish 
this are clearly stated in the contract: The Concessionaire can “establish, impose, 
charge, collect, use and enforce the collection and payment of Tolls” (Section 4.01). 
The ability to regulate the traffic speed is equally explicit in the contract: “The 
Concessionaire shall impose congestion pricing on the HOT Lanes, which may 
include dynamic tolling with potential toll rate changes at frequent intervals with a 
view to maintaining free flow conditions of traffic, and there shall be no restrictions 
on toll rates” (Section 4.04(a)).
Stakeholder Risk Reduction
In addition to HOVs, several other types of vehicles cannot be charged a toll for 
use of the HOT lanes. These include mass transit and commuter buses, school 
buses, and motorcycles. To reduce the Concessionaire’s revenue risk, the contract 
contains this provision regarding the volume of un-tolled HOVs in the HOT lane: 
“The department agrees to pay the Concessionaire… amounts equal to 70% of the 
Average Toll applicable to vehicles paying tolls for the number of High Occupancy 
Vehicles exceeding a threshold of 24% of total flow of all Permitted Vehicles that 
are using such toll section going in the same direction for the first 30 consecutive 
minutes during any day and any additional 15 consecutive minute periods” (Section 
13.05(b)). The complex wording reflects the difficulty of ensuring both free flow 
(a government goal) and profitability (a contractor goal).
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The ability to set rates does not assure a net profit for the concessionaire, as it 
must maintain a free flow condition and accept a large number of un-tolled vehicles. 
If toll prices are too low, it may not be able to maintain free flow. If it raises tolls 
too high to obtain free flow, too many drivers may avoid the toll lanes. 
The performance point system discussed above ensures a proper balance of 
interest between the Concessionaire and the Department. The point system can be 
likened to a scorecard, providing an accountability mechanism if the Concessionaire 
“breaches or fails to perform its obligations under the agreement”, the Department has 
the ability to assess performance points (Section 8.16). The point system measures 
Concessionaire performance across the agreed upon metrics of the contract; the 
accumulation of non-compliance performance points by the Concessionaire may 
further trigger remedies and provisions set forth including but not limited to greater 
oversight, additional monitoring, and financial penalty.
Profitability is constrained by two other requirements in the contract. First, 
maintenance standards were specified in the contract, which clearly states that 
the I-495 HOT lane cannot become a ‘federally degraded facility.’ Second, Fluor/
Transurban had to pay for all aspects of electronic tolling, including administration 
and enforcement. 
The I-95 Project
The contract for the I-95 HOV/HOT project -- Comprehensive agreement relating 
to the I-95 HOV/HOT lanes project (2012) -- was agreed to on July 31, 2012. The 
project called for the expansion and conversion of 14 miles of HOV lanes into three 
lanes of HOV/HOT lanes. It also extended 9 miles of existing HOV lanes, which 
would be tolled. However, as noted with the I-495 project, high occupancy vehicles 
would not pay a toll when using the HOT lanes. Single occupant vehicles in the toll 
lanes would pay a toll that varied by time of day and level of congestion. Thus, toll 
paying vehicles with only a driver and high occupancy vehicles with a driver and 
passenger(s) would use the same lanes. 
Sustainability Goals
The foremost goal of the project was to provide drivers with a choice of lanes with 
an operating speed performance standard (OSPS) of 55 miles per hour. The un-tolled 
lanes did not have an operating standard and could be congested with slow-moving 
or bumper-to-bumper traffic. This would be accomplished with electronic tolling. 
The project would also require variable toll fees to closely regulate driver use 
of the toll lane so as to maintain the 55 mph OSPS. When speeds fall below the 
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OSPS, the toll rate would rise to a level high enough to divert drivers to the un-tolled 
lanes. The means to accomplish this are explicitly stated in the contract: “From 
and after the Service Commencement Date and continuing during the Term, the 
Concessionaire will have the exclusive right to establish, impose, charge, collect, 
use and enforce the collection and payment of the Toll revenues in accordance with 
the terms of this Agreement” (Section 5.01(a)). The ability to regulate the traffic 
speed is equally clear: “The Concessionaire will impose congestion pricing on the 
HOT Lanes, which may include dynamic tolling with potential toll rate changes at 
frequent intervals and there will be no restrictions on toll rates” (Section502(a)). 
The agreement specifies that the pricing methodology must “be designed to assure 
that the Project will meet the OSPS” (Section 5.02 (a)(iii)).
Stakeholder Risk Reduction
While the Concessionaire is empowered to set tolls, it is not guaranteed a profit. 
Section 5.07(a) of the contract states: “The Department [of Transportation] will 
not have any risk or liability related to actual traffic volume and revenue, including 
but not limited to the risk that actual traffic volume is less than the traffic volume 
projected in the Base Case Financial Model.” 
The Concessionaire’s revenue risk, however, is reduced by a specific contract 
provision regarding the volume of un-tolled HOVs in the toll lanes. The contract reads: 
“From the period beginning on the second anniversary of the Service Commencement 
Date to December 31, 2030 (the ‘First Measurement Period”), the department will 
pay the Concessionaire amounts equal to 70% of the Average Toll for the number 
of High Occupancy Vehicles exceeding a threshold of 35% of the total flow of all 
Permitted Vehicles in two consecutive Toll Sections that are then using such Toll 
Sections going in the same direction for any period of 15 consecutive minutes.” 
(Section5.07(a)(i)). Similar provisions apply to the other two measurement periods 
that complete the 76-year term of the contract. How the 3P contracts analyzed in 
this chapter address other risks are discussed next.
In the highly congested Washington, D.C. area, the 55 mph OSPS may not be 
possible even with dynamic tolling with variable fee rates. The contract contains 
a process to address failures to meet the OSPS. Records of travel speeds are kept 
and a monthly report is mandated. The contract states: “the Concessionaire will 
notify the Department if the Concessionaire’s scheduled monthly report identifies 
any instance of the Project’s failure to meet the OSPS…The notice will describe 
such failure in reasonable detail. The Department will notify the Concessionaire 
within 30 days of its receipt of the Concessionaire’s report whether or not it requires 
an OSPS Improvement Plan” (Section 5.08(a)). The contract further makes clear 
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that the plan “will be required to propose a strategy to address the specific reasons 
which the Concessionaire reasonably believes caused such failure as described in the 
Concessionaire’s report” Section 5.08(b). The state DOT then reviews the submitted 
plan and the Concessionaire is required to promptly implement the elements of the 
plan that are deemed to be within its control. 
The contract does not automatically terminate if the OSPS is not met, but this 
may result in the accumulation of non-compliance points should the Department 
find the Concessionaire to be in breach of contract. In the event of a breach, the 
language calls for a good faith effort to reconcile or cure it; but recognizes the 
possibility of failure.
The first OSPS covers the initial 10 years of operation. Every 10 years a new 
one is negotiated; this includes the non-compliance performance point system. 
However, the contract stipulates that in a subsequent OSPS the 55 mph traffic flow 
requirement cannot be raised. 
DISCUSSION
Provisions to Counter Risk
3Ps are inherently risky, primarily because of the many and varied interests of 
stakeholders. As Roumboutsos and Pantelias (2015) aptly summarize, the contract is 
the nexus that merges the multiple interests, and “Paramount in the determination of 
this balance of interests is the management of risks and their subsequent allocation 
among the various stakeholders” (p. 186). 
Summing up, a number of stakeholder interests were addressed in the contracts 
but the exact outcomes are far from certain. Government officials and taxpayers 
benefit from the greatly reduced cost of construction, maintenance and operation. 
The expected reduction in congestion could save drivers time; it could also reduce 
air pollution and other environmental costs. Obviously, the drivers who paid the 
tolls or rode in high occupancy vehicles expect faster travel and less congestion. 
But, even those who choose not to pay the toll may experience some reduction in 
congestion when drivers switch to the toll lane. Of course, drivers can avoid the 
toll altogether and accept a slower drive. Alternatively, they can use local streets. 
Whatever their decision, all drivers benefit in their role as taxpayers, and they can 
choose to pay for the toll lane on occasion when time-pressured. The investors 
stand to make a reasonable profit so long as a sufficient number of drivers pay the 
requisite amount of toll.
189
Reducing Risk in Public-Private Partnership Contracts
While the taxpayers will save money on construction, the contractor may fail to 
adequately maintain the facility over the long durations of the contracts—80 years 
for the I-495 project and 76 years for the I-95 project. Moreover, the added toll lanes 
may fail to significantly reduce congestion. One potential reason for such a failure 
is the fact that the contractor is allowed to set the fee for the toll. Excessively high 
fees would impose a high cost for toll lane access and could shunt an excessive 
number of drivers into the un-tolled lanes. With greater congestion in the tolled 
lanes, there will be little or no net improvement in congestion and therefore, few, if 
any, environmental benefits. Allowing single occupancy vehicles to utilize HOV/
HOT lane might reduce the number of HOVs, if drivers abandon carpools and drive 
their own vehicles, thereby increasing the number of vehicles on the highway. 
As with many 3P projects, the two HOV/HOT lane projects presented significant 
revenue-related risks to the private sector. These projects rely on user-based 
remuneration (i.e., tolls) which are subject to demand risk (Roumboutsos & Pantelias, 
2015). Demand risk reflects the uncertainty in predicted demand, which in the two 
cases are associated with traffic volumes and free flow conditions. Addressing the 
revenue risk, such as by allowing the private sector flexibility in setting toll rates, is 
an important challenge to achieving optimal risk allocation, which is considered the 
cornerstone of any successful PPP arrangement (Roumboutsos & Pantelias, 2015). 
Table 3 lists some of the provisions in the contracts that reduce risks to stakeholders 
arising from private sector’s right to set toll fees and other concerns. While taxpayers 
benefit from the substantial private sector investment and obligation to operate and 
maintain the toll lanes, poor construction and maintenance are a possibility along 
with little improvement in traffic flow. The contracts addressed these concerns with 
clear construction and maintenance standards and a system to address failures to 
create free-flow conditions on I-495 and a 55 mph OSPS on I-95. The contract also 
contains a very detailed, yet flexible, non-compliance performance point system. 
It is designed to ensure timely efforts to cure breaches and failures on the part of 
the concessionaire.
The 3P projects offered the environmental benefit of consuming less land and 
encouraging free HOV and bus use. Faster travel and less congestion is more likely 
with the use of variable rate tolling, which allows for more effective traffic regulation. 
The absence of mandatory tolling benefits low income drivers. However, it is possible 
that private sector investors would not realize an adequate profit due to toll lanes 
failing to attract a sufficient number of toll-paying drivers. Several features of the 
contract offer some protection for the private partner—the foremost being the right 
to set toll fees and to vary them in response to traffic flow conditions. In addition, 
when HOV traffic reaches specified thresholds in the toll lanes, the government 
reimburses the concessionaire for HOV use.
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Protection against demand risk also come in the form of restrictions to competition 
such as when the 3P project can be considered a natural monopoly or in cases where 
a quasi- or temporary monopoly is created through the contractual arrangement 
(Roumboutsos & Pantelias, 2015). However, this risk to the private sector can come 
at a cost to public stakeholders who are forced into fewer options. Furthermore, 
the public sector seeks to minimize the likelihood of opportunistic behavior of the 
private partner (van Den Hurk & Verhoest, 2017). 
To protect the public interest, the state of Virginia retains the right to build a 
competing facility to handle traffic congestion in the region. In recognition of the 
potential impact of this on the concessionaire’s revenue, the contract states that the 
concessionaire can bid for the new highway project. This provision, which calls 
Table 3. Examples of potential stakeholder benefits and losses and contract provisions 
to reduce loss
Stakeholders Some Potential Benefits
Some Potential Losses/
Drawbacks
Examples of Contract 
Provision to Reduce Loss
Taxpayers
Public money saved 
on construction and 
maintenance
Little change in congestion 
and poor construction and 
maintenance
Construction and maintenance 
standards; OSPS improvement 
system
Environmentalists
Fewer miles driven/ 
reduced pollution; 
less land use
No measurable change in 
environmental impacts
Fewer lanes added; traffic free-
flow; OSPS 55 mph; electronic 
tolling
Drivers who use 
HOV lane or pay 
to use HOT lane
Faster travel; less 
congestion
High toll charges; fewer 
cars with multiple riders
Traffic free-flow; OSPS 55 mph; 
variable fees
Taxpayers who 
don’t use tolled 
facility




More traffic on local 
streets from drivers 
avoiding toll road
No reduction in number of un-






Increased congestion in 
toll free lanes; large toll 
fees
No mandatory tolling; diversion 
of drivers to toll lanes
Private investors Adequate long-term profit
Financial loss or low long-
term profit; construction of 
competing facility by DOT
Payments for heavy HOV usage 
of toll lanes; no limit on toll fees; 









Low savings; angry 
drivers and voters; 
little improvement 
in congestion; poor 
maintenance
Driver choice of un-tolled 
lanes; free-flow and OSPS 55; 
maintenance standards; non-
compliance performance point 
system; ability to terminate for 
failure to meet standards
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for fair treatment, is not unusual, as non-compete clauses have been phased out of 
recent 3P contracts due to their tendency to handcuff the public sector for the long 
term of the contract (Holeywell, 2013). 
CONCLUSION
Public-private partnerships offer a way for resource-strapped government agencies 
to meet the needs of multiple stakeholders (Estache, Juan, & Trujillo, 2007). In this 
chapter, we focused on contract provisions related to partner risks and incentives, two 
aspects of 3P contracts identified by Dewatripont and Legros (2005) as most critical 
to 3P success. In optimal 3P agreements, the contract contains provisions to properly 
balance the risks and rewards for the public and private sectors, while attending (to 
the extent possible) to those of other stakeholders (Ahadzi & Bowles, 2004). With 
increasing frequency, 3Ps have been used to fund large-scale infrastructure projects 
(Bennett & Iossa, 2006; Grout, 1997). Frequently, 3Ps save money by ‘bundling’ 
service provision (Hart, 2003). Virginia DOT did so by tying construction, operation, 
and maintenance into each contract. With bundling, the public sector is able to limit 
budgetary strain (Engel et al., 2013). 
However, electronic tolling technologies make it possible to pursue environmental 
benefits as well. Along with improvements in traffic flow, sustainable transportation 
projects can solve some of the social, financial, and ecological problems of urban 
community life. In this respect, sustainable transportation often focuses less on city 
growth and more on integrating transportation into current urban development, 
thereby consuming less land (Leuenberger, Bartle, & Chen, 2014). The 3Ps discussed 
in this chapter illustrate a more sustainable approach to congestion management by 
introducing HOV/HOT lanes and incorporating congestion pricing. The Virginia 
DOT avoided resorting to the traditional solution for traffic congestion—expanding 
traffic capacity through construction of many more additional lanes. In pursuit of 
sustainability, Virginia constructed fewer lanes, spent far less taxpayer money, and 
continued to encourage carpooling and bus transit. 
Due to the array of stakeholder interests addressed in the 3P contracts and the 
unpredictability of long term returns from the tolling lanes, the exact outcome for each 
Virginia stakeholder is difficult to predict. To foster accountability, the contractual 
provisions promote discussion and negotiation over the course of the partnership. 
The Virginia 3Ps demonstrate that it is possible to build constraints into the contract 
to reduce losses and promote a range of acceptable outcomes. The non-compliance 
performance point system, for instance, attempts to provide recourse for the public 
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in the event of a private sector breach of contract or failure to maintain desired 
performances. But it is accommodating, allowing for much discussion and creative 
negotiation within stated parameters, the hallmarks of emergent accountability
Of course, many of the devices used in these contracts apply to simple contracts 
as well as to the more complex conditions associated with public-private partnerships 
for tolling. For example, the contract contained detailed specifications for the new 
toll lanes and technologies along with an oversight role for the DOT to ensure 
proper materials and desired construction quality. But many of the provisions 
laid out in the contract were less specific and were meant to balance the needs of 
various stakeholders in ways that implicitly accept a range of outcomes over the long 
term. Still, despite the uncertainties involved over the many years of the contracts, 
Virginia’s stakeholders appear to like this type of contract. Since the I-495 and I-95 
HOV/HOT projects were begun, four additional HOT/HOV projects have been 
introduced, albeit not all are 3Ps. 
Despite the positives of bundling service provision, leveraging private assets, and 
utilizing technology in a manner that promotes environmental sustainability, there 
are several reasons for caution. Given the scope of this research, examining two case 
studies within the same state, it is impossible to draw firm generalizable conclusions 
that may apply across the state and country. Each contract is unique, the needs of 
the locality and state vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction; yet what the cases do 
reveal is how nuanced each situation and agreement is. The need for sustainable 
infrastructure, the contractual nuance that creates and maintains accountability, and 
the importance of shared risk all illustrate key provisions that can be studied and 
evaluated across contracts and jurisdictions. 
Given their numerous benefits, we expect to see more HOV/HOT tolling projects 
in the future. In addition, to reducing reliance on state and local governments for 
the funding of new infrastructure, these projects add another layer of financial 
sustainability to transportation development by reducing reliance on the motor fuel 
tax, which in this era of fuel efficient and electric vehicles, is producing increasingly 
inadequate revenue for road building and maintenance (Chen, (2014). And they 
reduce the overall environmental harm of fossil fuel consumption by increasing 
the cost of driving, resulting in more use of transit and fewer miles driven in single 
occupancy vehicles (Bartle & Devan, 2006; Black, 2010; Leuenberger & Bartle, 2009; 
O’Connell & Yusuf, 2013; Wachs, 2003; Yusuf, O’Connell, & Abutabenjeh, 2011). 
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KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS
Capital Beltway Express LLC: An entity formed by Fluor and Transurban to 
design, finance, construct, and ultimately operate the I-495 high-occupancy tolling 
lanes, designed to moderate and ease congestion around the nation’s capital.
Contracting Out: Is a means of delivering public services and/or performing 
public functions where the government provides compensation to an outside party 
in exchange for a defined set of services or functions. Also known as outsourcing.
Emergent Accountability: The flexible accountability mechanisms built into 
the contractual agreements to provide recourse and contingencies that ensure a fair 
and equitable process for all involved parties.
Express Lanes: Express Lanes are specially-designated highway lanes that 
allow drivers to choose to pay a toll to use the lanes and that are free to carpools, 
motorcycles, vanpools and other eligible vehicles during the designated hours 
of operation. Express lanes operate under the premise of reducing congestion by 
incenting and rewarding desired behaviors and/or those willing to pay a toll.
Fluor-Transurban: A principal parties in the I-495 and I-95 roadway projects. 
Fluor Corporation provides services on a global basis in the fields of engineering, 
procurement, construction, operations, maintenance and project management. 
Transurban Group is an international toll road investor and manager with more than 
10 years of experience developing and operating complex toll road infrastructure.
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High Occupancy Toll (HOT) Lanes: Lanes accessed by vehicles with multiple 
occupants and charged a fee for use (especially at high traffic times) to encourage 
carpooling and a less congested route for the drivers while also reducing congestion 
on alternative routes. A form of transportation demand management that reduces 
congestion through dynamic tolling practices.
High Occupancy Vehicle (HOV) Lanes: HOV lanes refer to high occupancy 
vehicles. HOV lanes reduce congestion by promoting carpooling and ridesharing 
practices. Lanes accessed by vehicles with multiple occupants (especially at high 
traffic times) to encourage carpooling and ridesharing, and to reduce congestion. 
A form of transportation demand management.
I-95 Express Lanes LLC: An entity formed by Fluor and Transurban to design, 
finance, construct, and ultimately operate the I-95 high-occupancy tolling lanes, 
designed to moderate and ease congestion around the nation’s capital.
Public-Private Partnership (3P): A partnership between a government agency 
and the private sector in the delivery of goods or services to the public. P3s have 
been widely implemented in the U.S.A. and across the world for services and 
infrastructures related to transportation, social services, and waste disposal.
Tolling: A form of road pricing in which a fee is assessed for use of the tolled 
facility.
Virginia Department of Transportation (VDOT): The Virginia Department 
of Transportation is the state agency for the Commonwealth of Virginia (USA) 
with the primary responsibility for building, maintaining, and operating the roads, 
bridges, and tunnels in the state. For transportation-related P3s in the state, VDOT 
represents the interests of the Commonwealth.
